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CASE NOTE

that the hardships necessarily involved in
compelling a witness to travel and attend
court in Illinois are offset by the benefits
derived by society at large.
(2) Suppose, on the other hand, a request is
made by a Florida court upon a court in the
State of Washington for the procurement of a
witness needed in a minor criminal prosecution. If the Washington court is satisfied with
the requirements of materiality and necessity,
the remaining area of "undue hardship" may
be raised. Will it cause the particular witness
undue hardship to compel him to travel across
the country to testify in a seemingly minor
prosecution? In this situation perhaps the
value of the testimony is overbalanced by the
hardship inflicted on the witness, and thus
although a witness' testimony may be
material and necessary, his attendance may
nevertheless not be required.
What if the hypotheticals are changed so that
the supposed murder was committed in Florida
and the witness resided in Washington? Does
this change the conclusions regarding "undue
hardship?" Or further assume that the minor
criminal action is in Illinois and the witness is in
Indiana. Does this change the conclusions regarding "undue hardship?" The extremities presented in the original hypotheticals can easily be
altered to reveal borderline situations which the
courts have not yet decided.
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The decision in each particular case necessitates
a balancing between the value conferred upon the
state in obtaining the witness, as opposed to the
hardship caused to the witness by compelling his
attendance. The value derived should clearly
offset the hardship encountered in order to justify
the witness' burden. When society as a whole
greatly profits from the criminal prosecution, then
the hardship on the particular individual must be
subordinate.
It can be seen that in each particular situation
the discretionary power of the judge in either the
requesting state or the foreign state plays an
important role. Each fact situation necessarily
stands separately and must be dealt with
accordingly.
Since one accused of a crime has the right to
be faced with his accuser, it would be an empty
victory for a state to acquire custody of an accused,
should the state be unable to procure the necessary witnesses with which to prosecute.23 The
Uniform Act does not place the states in this
anomalous position.
21 In most cases the accused has the right to confront
the witnesses against him face to face. See, 14 As.
JuR. 890, Criminal Law, §178; 23 C.J.S. 360, Criminal

Law, §999; 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2195e; U.S. CoNsr.

amend. IV. It is usually not legally possible for the
prosecution to use the deposition of an absent witness
against the accused at his trial. See, 5 Wigmore, Evidence §1397, 1399, 1403-11 (3rd ed. 1940). The same
constitutional guarantee of confrontation is not present
in civil actions and generally the deposition may be
used.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Military Court Martial Jurisdiction Over
Civilians During Peacetime-In three recen
cases, the United States Supreme Court has once
again considered the problem of military courtsmartial jurisdiction over civilians.
In previous decisions the Court had established
that courts-martial do not have jurisdiction over
civilians for offenses committed within the continental limits of the United States where the
civilian courts were available and in Reid v. Covert,
351 U.S. 487 (1956) and Kinsella v. Krueger, 351
U.S. 470 (1956), courts-martial were denied jurisdiction over civilian dependents of military
personnel on overseas military reservations who
were charged with the commission of capital
offenses. Left in doubt was the rationale for the
Court's decisions in these cases. Would different
treatment be accorded civilian employees charged
with capital offenses or dependents or civilian
employees charged with non-capital offenses? Did

the cases cited above employ a test of status of
the accused or one based upon the nature of the
offense?
Courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians is
sanctioned by article 2(11) of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §802(11) (1956)).
The constitutional authority for this statute is
thought to be found in the United States Constitution, art. IV, §3, wherein Congress is
empowered to "make all needful Rules and Regulations" for the "Territories" of the United
States. Further authority has been claimed as
appearing in art. I, §8, cl. 14, "to make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces" as supplemented by the Necessary
and Proper Clause of art. I, §8, cl. 18. In applying
these powers to civilian dependents, however, the
statute must also satisfy the requirements of
article III and the fifth and sixth amendments of
the Constitution.1 In the cases cited above, the

